2023 Beijing International Graduate Conference in Analytic Philosophy

2023 北京国际分析哲学研究生学术研讨会

January 7th – 8th, 2023
Beijing Normal University

Normativity and Rationality

规范性与理性

Host   School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University
北京师范大学哲学学院

Institute of Foreign Philosophy and Culture, Beijing Normal University
北京师范大学外国哲学与文化研究所

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《亚洲哲学杂志》

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CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Jan 6, 2023

09:00 – 11:00 **Keynote by Prof. Paul Boghossian (New York University)**

Title: Realism, Relativism and Nihilism about the Normative

Zoom Meeting Room: 812-4460-6916
Password: 572940
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81244606916

Jan 7, 2023

08:30 – 18:50 **Conference Day 1** (See detailed program below)

Zoom Meeting Room A: 824-8794-5240
Password: 437657
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82487945240

Zoom Meeting Room B: 832-5180-9947
Password: 382794
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83251809947

Jan 8, 2023

08:30 – 18:50 **Conference Day 2** (See detailed program below)

Zoom Meeting Room A: 824-8794-5240
Password: 437657
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82487945240

Zoom Meeting Room B: 832-5180-9947
Password: 382794
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83251809947

Jan 21, 2023   **(Satellite Event)**

09:00 – 11:00 Announcement of the Prizes for Best and Runner-up Student Papers

Keynote by Prof. Shamik Dasgupta (UC Berkeley)

Title: Objectivity as a Normative Notion (Twice Over)

Zoom Meeting Room: 865-2611-2378
Password: 536476
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86526112378

Conference Day 1 (Jan 7, 2023)

	ZOOM Meeting Room A: 824-8794-5240 Password: 437657	ZOOM Meeting Room B: 832-5180-9947 Password: 382794
	Session 1 Epistemology **Chair: Davide Fassio** (Zhejiang University) Davide Fassio（浙江大学）	**Session 2** Moral Philosophy **Chair: Long Chen** (Beijing Normal University) 陈龙（北京师范大学）
8:30 – 9:20	**Sebastian Liu** (Princeton University) Sebastian Liu（普林斯顿大学） Fragile Epistemic States and Rational Epistemic Akrasia	**Joseph Masotti** (Florida State University) Joseph Masotti（弗罗里达州立大学） Objective Oughts When You Simply Cannot
9:20 – 10:10	**Chen Chen** (Fudan University) 谌辰（复旦大学） Everyday Disagreement and Diachronic Duty	**Jian Zhang** (Nanyang Technological University) Jian Zhang（南洋理工大学） Against Pluralistic Eliminativism of Morality
10:10 – 10:20	10 min break	
10:20 – 11:10	**Xian He** (Zhejiang University) 何弦（浙江大学） The Practical Threshold of Epistemic Reason	**Zhonghua Zheng** (Peking University) 郑中华（北京大学） How Might Aquinas Respond to Davidson? – An Interpretation of Aquinas' Theory of Incontinence
11:10 – 12:00	**Yibai Liu** (Renmin University of China) 刘一白（中国人民大学） A Virtues-based Permissivism	**Guxing Chen** (Beijing Normal University) 陈姑星（北京师范大学） Practical Knowledge and Moral Knowledge
	Session 3 Epistemology, Metaphysics **Chair: Yiwen Zhan** (Beijing Normal University) 展翼文（北京师范大学）	**Session 4** Moral Philosophy **Chair: Stefan Petkov** (Beijing Normal University) Stefan Petkov（北京师范大学）
13:30 – 14:20	**Guowei Lai** (Zhejiang University) 赖国伟（浙江大学） Weighing Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief: A New Model	**Jinhui Wang** (Fudan University) 王瑾辉（复旦大学） To Be or Not to Be an Agent: Is That a Question?
14:20 – 15:10	**Chenhao Lu** (East China Normal University) 陆晨浩（华东师范大学） How to Lie with Modals	**Wai Lok Cheung** (Chinese University of Hong Kong) 张炜乐（香港中文大学） Agency: Recursivity of Self-Determination Through the Materiality of Causation
15:10 – 16:00		**Xinyi Zhan** (Peking University) 詹心怡（北京大学） Does Anti-criterialism Lead to an Unacceptable Consequence?
16:00 – 16:20	20 min break	
16:20 – 17:10	**Zhengguan Chen** (Humboldt University of Berlin) Zhengguan Chen（柏林洪堡大学） A Conceptual Relativist Amendment to Burke's Monism	**Kangyu Wang** (London School of Economics and Political Science) Kangyu Wang（伦敦政治经济学院） What Makes Life Meaningful? A Novel Subjectivist Theory
17:10 – 18:00	**Dawei Wu** (Free University of Berlin) 伍大卫（柏林自由大学） Composite Agency and Artifact Abilities	**Kida Lin** (University of Oxford) Kida Lin（牛津大学） Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, the Transfer of Prerogatives, and Moral Interests
18:00 – 18:50	**Mingkun Chen** (University of Cambridge) 陈明坤（剑桥大学） Apply Mereotopology to Material Composition	**Yihan Shang** (Fudan University) Yihan Shang（复旦大学） The Nexus of Political Normativity, and How to Argue for It

Conference Day 2 (Jan 8, 2023)

	ZOOM Meeting Room A: 824-8794-5240 Password: 437657	ZOOM Meeting Room B: 832-5180-9947 Password: 382794
	Session 5 Epistemology **Chair: Changsheng Lai** (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) 赖长生（上海交通大学）	**Session 6** Philosophy of Language and Logic **Chair: Zhao Fan** (Kobe University) 樊钊（神户大学）
8:30 – 9:20	**Bin Zhao** (UC Irvine) 赵斌（加利福尼亚大学尔湾分校） On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives	**Lei Wang** (Fudan University) 王磊（复旦大学） The Metasemantic Foundations for Global Conceptual Engineering
9:20 – 10:10	**Tianqin Ren** (University of Missouri-Columbia) 任天勤（密苏里大学哥伦比亚分校） Luck, Malfunction and Warranted Belief from an Evolutionary Perspective	**Kai Wang** (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) 王开（上海交通大学） The Definition of Videogames: Normative Amelioration?
10:10 – 10:20	10 min break	
10:20 – 11:10	**Qiantong Wu** (National University of Singapore) 吴倩彤（新加坡国立大学） Nguyen's Echo Chamber and Why the Escape Plan Can be Less "Epistemic" than We Expect	**Zhiyuan Zhang** (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen) 张致远（香港中文大学，深圳） Defending Strong Truth Pluralism
11:10 – 12:00	**Enyuan Kang** (East China Normal University) 康恩源（华东师范大学） Why We Should Spread Rumors	**Shaowen Ji** (Sun Yat-sen University) 纪少文（中山大学） Regulative Norms and Localism: Revisit the Skeptical Challenge of Logical Normativity
	Session 7 Special Session for Chinese Papers **Chair: Haiqiang Dai** (Beijing Normal University) 代海强（北京师范大学）	**Session 8** Philosophy of Mind and Action, Metaphysics **Chair: Tung-Ying Wu** (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Sciences) 吴东颖（中国科学院哲学研究所）
13:30 – 14:20	**Yiheng Wang** (Xiamen University) 王译恒（厦门大学） Is Common Knowledge a Necessary Condition for Social Coordination? – An Investigation on the Paradox of Coordinated Attack Based on the Margin for Error Principle	**Jakob Roloff** (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen) Jakob Roloff（吉森大学） A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions
14:20 – 15:10	**Luqi Tang** (Zhejiang University) 唐璐琪（浙江大学） Certainty: An Ignored Epistemic Notion	**Yihui Cheng** (Peking University) Yihui Cheng（北京大学） How to Stop Worry about Swampman in Teleosemantics: A New Response to the Swampman Argument
15:10 – 16:00	**Shengnan Zhao** (Lanzhou University) 赵胜男（兰州大学） Is Wittgenstein a Foundationalist of Knowledge? – A View on the Relations between Certainty and the Language Games	**Tong Pan** (The University of Manchester) 潘童（曼彻斯特大学） Why the Interventionist Should Still Worry about the Exclusion Argument
16:00 – 16:20	20 min break	
16:20 – 17:10	**Rong Zhu** (Jiangsu Normal University) 竺蓉（江苏师范大学） Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth with the State of Affairs	**He Yuan** (Wuhan University) 袁和（武汉大学） The Epistemic Status of Observation for Dismissivism
17:10 – 18:00	**Feng Deng** (China University of Political Science and Law) 邓峰（中国政法大学） Autonomy and the Reasons for Action	**Kam-Ho Chan** (Hong Kong Baptist University) Kam-Ho Chan（香港浸会大学） Creationism and Fictionalism about Fictional Characters: Analyzing Metafictional and Metaleptic Discourse
18:00 – 18:50	**Yupeng Wang** (Nanjing Normal University) 汪禹澎（南京师范大学） The Self-Basis of Rawls' First Principle of Justice	**Youssef Aguisoul** (University of Lisbon) Youssef Aguisoul（里斯本大学） Pure Universals: Total and Partial

ABSTRACTS

摘 要 集

Fragile Epistemic States and Rational Epistemic Akrasia

Sebastian Liu (Princeton University)
Sebastian Liu（普林斯顿大学）

Abstract: Sometimes, when you're either uncertain what your evidence is or uncertain what your evidence supports, respecting your evidence requires you to be epistemically akratic – to believe p while believing that p is unlikely on your evidence. But epistemic akrasia seems paradigmatically incoherent and therefore irrational. In these instances, the putative rational requirements of believing in accordance with your evidence and avoiding incoherent combinations of beliefs appear to conflict. This paper aims to resolve this conflict. On the view that emerges, epistemic akrasia is not a genuine form of incoherence; however, surprisingly, you ought not believe that your evidence ever permits you to be epistemically akratic on any particular occasion. Crucially, whenever your evidence licenses akratic beliefs, you'll be in 'fragile' epistemic state, a state which, for principled reasons, you should never believe that you're in. This characteristic of fragile epistemic states offers a natural explanation for why akratic beliefs merely appear irrational.

Everyday Disagreement and Diachronic Duty

Chen Chen (Fudan University)
谌辰（复旦大学）

Abstract: In response to the challenge that a peer disagreement is hard to find in real life, Jonathan Matheson proposed his view about everyday disagreement based on the Equal Weight View. His view is exclusively about synchronic epistemic duties related with everyday disagreements, i.e., it concerns the doxastic attitude the subject ought to take immediately after recognizing the disagreement. However, even coupled with Richard Feldman's "Evidence of evidence is evidence" slogan, his view is inadequate in that it cannot account for the epistemic significance of a specific kind of higher-order evidence which is common constituent of everyday disagreements. This kind of higher- order evidence (HOEIE) indicates the existence of a piece of relevant evidence. An intuitively appropriate response to HOEIE is to gather the evidence indicated by it. And such a response is also required to achieve our epistemic goal of having all and only true beliefs about important propositions. Thus, we have a diachronic epistemic duty (GIE) to gather the evidence indicated by HOEIE. At last, it is argued that GIE is a prima facie duty and is not necessary for knowledge.

Key words: everyday disagreements; diachronic epistemic duty; higher-order evidence.

The Practical Threshold of Epistemic Reason

Xian He (Zhejiang University)
何弦（浙江大学）

Abstract: Moderate pragmatists hold that there is an all-things-considered verdict when the epistemic reason conflicts with the practical reason for belief. Then it faces the question of how to weigh epistemic reason with practical reason for belief. According to some recent models of how to compare epistemic reason and practical reason, the normative force of epistemic reasons seems to be significantly reduced, if not eliminated, once the practical reason is above a certain threshold. While I take moderate pragmatism as a basic assumption, I consider and examine three possible ways to locate the threshold and argue that only one of them can account for some crucial features of the threshold. According to this account, there are default practical reasons to follow epistemic reasons and that the threshold at which it is rational to believe for practical reasons lies at the point at which there is combined practical reason to reject the epistemic reason for a certain doxastic attitude. By explaining and locating this threshold, this essay concludes that moderate pragmatism, to explain the weighing behavior, shall slip into a position that is close to strong pragmatism.

A Virtues-based Permissivism

Yibai Liu (Renmin University of China)
刘一白（中国人民大学）

Abstract: Permissivism is the view that there can be multiple rational beliefs in any evidential situation. In this paper, I'll defend permissivism against an objection called the arbitrariness objection by developing a virtues-based permissivism. The plan is as follows. First, I'll start by providing some clarifications and a reconstruction of the arbitrariness objection. After that, I will examine the mainstream response which appeals to the concept of "epistemic standards", and argue that all versions of it are faced with serious problems. Finally, I'll motivate and develop a novel virtues-based response that can avoid these problems, and then defend it against potential objections.

Objective Oughts When You Simply Cannot

Joseph Masotti (Florida State University)
Joseph Masotti（弗罗里达州立大学）

Abstract: Some philosophers deny that uncertainty and ignorance about the relevant facts for our moral decisions has a bearing on what our moral obligations are; that is, they claim that our obligations are not epistemically or evidentially sensitive.1 This view is known as the Objective View. Still, many philosophers hold that the principle of Ought Implies Can (OIC) is true. I suggest that what we can do is often contingent on our evidential circumstances. So, combined with OIC, what we ought to do is contingent on our evidential circumstances, and thus the Objective View is false. In this paper, I explore how our obligations plausibly depend on a notion of "can," relevant for OIC, that is evidentially sensitive. I then show that a version of the Objective View that attempts to avoid this conclusion by denying our obligations to some act-types would imply that we have very implausible obligations.

Against Pluralistic Eliminativism of Morality

Jian Zhang (Nanyang Technological University)
Jian Zhang（南洋理工大学）

Abstract: There is a rise of pluralistic eliminativism, which holds that some concepts should be eliminated because it is too ambiguous or hard to be defined. Some philosophers with a bent on psychological research propose that we should eliminate the concept MORALITY because MORALITY is a too ambiguous concept. I argue that this pluralistic eliminative project overlooks the complexity of eliminating a concept. There are at least five main reasons for eliminating a concept, among which is pluralistic eliminativism. To eliminate a concept, it is at least possible we could argue that a concept meets all five eliminating reasons. In light of it, I consider Sinnott-Armstrong's and Stich's pluralistic eliminative projects on MORALITY. I argue that they neglect other eliminating reasons for a concept, and we should retain the concept MORALITY because we do not have sufficient reasons to eliminate it yet.

How might Aquinas respond to Davidson? – An interpretation of Aquinas' theory of incontinence

Zhonghua Zheng (Peking University)
郑中华（北京大学）

Abstract: Donald Davidson famously defines the incontinence as a type of intentional action contrary to the best judgment. He criticizes Aquinas for failing to offer a substantial explanation of incontinence. I argue that Davidson's criticism is wrong, both historically and philosophically. Aquinas' incontinence meets Davidson's definition, and can respond to his criticism as well. Aquinas draws on a certain psychic faculty, the will, to guarantee the agency of incontinence. Aquinas' generally treats incontinence as some qualified ignorance: the incontinent agent has no particular knowledge of the action to be done in the very particular situation. Aquinas' theory of incontinence, philosophically attractive by itself, opens a new path different from both what Davidson criticizes and Davidson's own theory.

Key words：Davidson, Aquinas, Incontinence, Will, Ignorance, Practical syllogism

Practical Knowledge and Moral Knowledge

Guxing Chen (Beijing Normal University)
陈姑星（北京师范大学）

Abstract: This paper addresses the relationship between Anscombe's practical knowledge and moral knowledge. I argue that, for Anscombe, intentional action involves moral consideration, and the reasons for action are the ends pursued by the agent. In this view, knowing what one is doing and knowing the intended good of doing it are two different aspects of one and the same practical knowledge. Moral knowledge, for Aristotle, is the practical knowledge of a practical wise, or virtuous person. So, I argue that moral knowledge can be understood as a special kind of Anscombe's practical knowledge, which is good practical knowledge or ethical practical knowledge.

Keywords: intentional action, practical knowledge, moral knowledge, knowing to do, practical wisdom

摘要：本文讨论了安斯康姆的实践知识与道德知识之间的联系。我认为，对安斯康姆来说，意向行动包含了道德上的考虑，行动的理由也是行动者所追求的目的。在这种观点中，知道自己在做什么和知道自己做这件事的意图的善是同一实践知识的两个不同方面。对亚里士多德来说，道德知识是一个实践的智者或有德行的人的实践知识。因此，我认为，道德知识可以被理解为一种特殊的安斯康姆意义上的实践知识，即好的实践知识或伦理的实践知识。

Weighing Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief: A New Model

Guowei Lai (Zhejiang University)
赖国伟（浙江大学）

Abstract: Some philosophers claim that there are both epistemic and practical reasons for belief. Based on this assumption, a question is how to weigh epistemic and practical reasons for belief to draw all-things-considered normative verdicts. Recently, Andrew Reisner (2008) and Christopher Howard (2020) propose their weighing models, respectively. Reisner's model faces Berker's problem. And Howard's model tries to avoid this problem. In this paper, first, I argue that Howard's model fails because this model faces two problems: (a) this model cannot draw plausible all-things- considered normative verdicts about some cases, and (b) this model would lead to other counter-intuitive consequences. Based on these analyses, I propose and defend a new weighing model, which has all advantages of Howard's model and avoids all its disadvantages.

摘要：一些学者认为存在信念的认知以及实用理由。在此基础上，一个问题是如何权衡信念的认知与实用理由以得出总体规范性裁定。近些年来，雷思勒（2008）与浩沃德（2020）分别提出了其各自的权衡模型。其中雷思勒的模型面临一个严重的问题，即贝克问题。后来浩沃德的模型则是力图避免这个问题。本文首先论证浩沃德的模型也是不成功的，因为这个模型面临两个问题：（a）这个模型就某些案例无法给出有说服力的总体规范性裁定，（b）这个模型存在其它的反直觉后果。在此基础上，本文提出并辩护一个新的权衡模型，这个模型具有浩沃德模型的优点而没有其缺点。

关键词：信念；规范理由；认知理由；实用理由；权衡模型

How to Lie with Modals

Chenhao Lu (East China Normal University)
陆晨浩（华东师范大学）

Abstract: According to an influential definition, a lie is an insincere assertion. That is, people lie by asserting something that they believe to be false. In this paper, I argue that this definition faces a serious challenge from so-called justification-with-risk cases, in which a subject's act of asserting an epistemic possibility sentence, might-p, won't be seen as lying, even if she believes that not-p. Two specific claims are defended: first, all contextualist definitions of lying fail because they are unable to handle the justification-with-risk cases, and second, an expressivist alternative is preferable due to its explanatory advantage in those cases.

Keywords: Lying, epistemic modality, contextualism, weak assertion

A Conceptual Relativist Amendment to Burke's Monism

Zhengguan Chen (Humboldt University of Berlin)
Zhengguan Chen（柏林洪堡大学）

Abstract: Could distinct objects occupy the same place at the same time? So long as one has not been exposed to professional philosophy, one could easily answer, "No! If my teacup is already there, of course I can't put my cellphone, or another identical teacup in that region at the same time!" However, if a philosopher points out to her that, while a statue was created yesterday, the piece of copper from which it is made is not created yesterday, one could conclude (by Leibniz's Law) that these two objects are distinct yet coincident. In this paper, I will consider as 'pluralism' of ordinary objects Sosa's explosionism and as 'monism' Burke's dominant-sortal theory. In section 2, I will introduce Sosa's doctrine by showing what his argumentation is, how he disposes of 'the grounding problem', and how his thesis can be accommodated with our common-sense judgments. In section 3, I will present Burke's monism by displaying how his theory accounts for the identity relationship of the objects commonly held to be coincident, and how he construes the persistence conditions that the only existing object in a given location has. My main purpose in this paper is to show that the explosionist thesis could raise a challenge to Burke's monism, and then to offer a possible solution to this challenge by resorting to conceptual relativism. These tasks will be pursued in section 4 and 5 respectively.

Composite Agency and Artifact Abilities

Dawei Wu (Free University of Berlin)
伍大卫（柏林自由大学）

Abstract: Living in an era where the lives of ordinary people are deeply entangled with artifacts of various kinds, a philosophical investigation into the nature of artifacts is worthwhile. This essay invokes the resources from the contemporary philosophy of dispositions and abilities to provide a novel perspective of the metaphysical nature of artifact function (and hence artifacts abilities) with a special focus on the role of human beings in relation to artifacts via the process of their ability-manifestation. This essay mainly concerns the metaphysical foundation and ascription of artifact abilities. By introducing and discussing some interconnected issues in contemporary debates including semantic analysis, intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and causal basis, this essay is anticipated to establish a sophisticated account of artifacts abilities, which suggests that artifacts abilities must be understood as the composite agency and human beings are an essential constituent.

Apply Mereotopology to Material Composition

Mingkun Chen (University of Cambridge)
陈明坤（剑桥大学）

Abstract: The Special Composition Question is the question 'When do some things compose something?'. The most popular answer is Restrictivism, which holds that sometimes two or more non-overlapping things compose something, and that sometimes they do not compose anything. Within Restrictivism, Carmichael (2015) proposed the most representative Series-style Answer (SSA) and defend this answer from van Inwagen's transitivity problem. In the paper, I will argue that Carmichael's SSA cannot successfully save it from the transitivity problem, so I will propose a preciser version of SSA, through mereology and mereotopology, to better address this problem. Specifically, I will offer my positive justifications for this SSA and show why it is a better choice for SSA theorists.

Keywords: composition, objects, parthood, mereotopology, mereology

To be or not to be an agent: is that a question?

Jinhui Wang (Fudan University)
王瑾辉（复旦大学）

Abstract: This paper deals with constitutivism＇s reply to Enoch＇s "shmagency objection", arguing that transcendental argument appealing to the "inescapability" of agency fails to silence the agency-skepticism. Owing to the equivocation on the concept of agent (agency), it＇s not self-defeating for skeptics to ask "why be agents" question. The refinement of transcendental argument by distinguishing "internal skepticism" and "external skepticism" doesn＇t work as well because internal skepticism is not irrelevant as constitutivists think. A agency-skeptic standing inside the space of Reason as such can still ask for a particular reason of being an agent. There are no normative significance of agency and its constitutive implied by the fact "a skeptic is already an agent inescapably" merely, because a skeptic can also be a "shmskeptic" who doesn＇t care about being skeptics with no normative pressure. In conclusion, consitituvism can＇t justify normative authority of particular principles only appealing to the inescapability of agency.

Key words: constitutivism shmagency-question inescapability transcendental argument

Agency: recursivity of self-determination through the materiality of causation

Wai Lok Cheung (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
张炜乐（香港中文大学）

Abstract: I will first distinguish, in metaphysics, determinism, indeterminacy, and determinateness, and show that metaphysical indeterminacy is compatible with metaphysical determinism. I will then present what causation is that agency is real through difference making. In the context of mental causation, it begs the question of what causal closure is, and what it is for something to belong to a physical system, given that the mind is embedded in the environment, and thus extended through the body in interaction with it. Mere physicality does not constitute mentality. Lastly, I will describe libertarian freewill formally using recursive function, and distinguish recursivity from indexicality. Self-knowledge has its failure form in that what seems to be the object of consciousness in self-consciousness is in fact only fictitiously a person; self-consciousness does not constitute personhood. It is possible that one seems to oneself to be a self-sustaining system but is in fact not.

Does Anti-criterialism Lead to an Unacceptable Consequence?

Xinyi Zhan (Peking University)
詹心怡（北京大学）

Abstract: Are there any criteria of personal persistence? Anti-criterialists give a negative answer. Duncan challenges anti-criterialim in two steps: the first step is to argue that anti-criterialists must exclude informative metaphysically sufficient conditions for personal persistence; the second step is to argue that such an exclusion leads to an unacceptable consequence that a person may fail to persist even though a later person has all of the qualitative connections with her. This paper aims to refute the second step. I argue that this consequence is acceptable for it does not undermine our daily beliefs that we persist. The second step is based on the incorrect assumption that we need to consider personal persistence in all possible worlds. This wrong assumption reveals the excessive ambition of criterialism to seek criteria of personal persistence with metaphysical necessity. Actually, since what we care about is our own survival and persistence, we do not need to consider remote and weird possible worlds.

Keywords: personal identity; persistence; criteria of identity; anti-criterialim

What makes life meaningful? A novel subjectivist theory

Kangyu Wang (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Kangyu Wang（伦敦政治经济学院）

Abstract: What, if anything, gives rise to the meaning of life? I aim to propose a novel subjectivist answer, which I call meaning-in-deed. I will proceed as follows: first, I shall explain meaning-in-deed and make some crucial clarifications. I shall then show its superiority by comparing it with Wolf's conception, which I take to be the most influential and successful candidate theory on the table—I simply cannot consider all existing theories in any case. Finally, I shall show how meaning-in-deed handles some more general anti-subjectivism challenges.

Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, the Transfer of Prerogatives, and Moral Interests

Kida Lin (University of Oxford)
Kida Lin（牛津大学）

Abstract: Lesser-evil justifications obtain when the disparity between the harm that an act averts and the harm that it inflicts overcomes the presumptive deontological constraint against doing harm. This article defends the thesis that acting on these justifications is ordinarily merely permissible (the Mere Permission Thesis), rather than required (the Requirement Thesis). It does so by developing a new account of "lesser-evil options" (moral options not to act on lesser-evil justifications), according to which we have lesser-evil options because we can act on the agent-relative prerogatives of our prospective victims. Specifically, the agent-relative prerogatives of our prospective victims can successfully be transferred, in the sense that they now protect and justify our act of not acting on lesser-evil justifications.

The Nexus of Political Normativity, and How to Argue for It

Yihan Shang (Fudan University)
Yihan Shang（复旦大学）

Abstract: This paper examines the structure and proper justification for the cluster of normative concepts operative within the political domain: authority, obligation, and coercion. Jointly, I propose a framework of structuring them into what I call a Nexus of Political Normativity, represented by three separate yet intertwining principles: Power, Obligation, and Right. I show how a range of the contemporary debates in political normativity could be understood in light of these three principles within the Nexus. Then, I turn to examine the question of how (not) to argue for the Nexus, from the standpoint of the political liberal. I first examine one popular yet unsuccessful justification for the Nexus: the classical Natural Duty Argument. Drawing on fundamental principles available within political liberalism, I argue this argument has significant shortcomings. I close by developing a tentative, but more promising approach to how we should argue for the Nexus: by drawing on values already implicit from the overlapping consensus of modern democracies, namely, a principle of political equality.

On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives

Bin Zhao (UC Irvine)
赵斌（加利福尼亚大学尔湾分校）

Abstract: According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, S knows that p only if S's belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. The sensitivity condition is usually relativized to belief-formation methods to avoid putative counterexamples. A remaining issue for the account is where methods should be mentioned in the sensitivity subjunctives. In this paper, I argue that if methods are mentioned in the antecedent, then the account is too strong to accommodate inductive knowledge; if methods are mentioned in the consequent, then the account is too weak to eliminate some luckily true beliefs from the realm of knowledge. Therefore, the strategy to relativize the sensitivity condition is undermined by inductive knowledge and some luckily true beliefs.

Luck, Malfunction and Warranted Belief from an Evolutionary Perspective

Tianqin Ren (University of Missouri-Columbia)
任天勤（密苏里大学哥伦比亚分校）

Abstract: This paper criticizes the proper functionalist account of knowledge. According to proper functionalism, a belief is knowledge only if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a truth-aimed design plan. In face of the counterexamples from un-designed cognitive improvements, proper functionalists argue that either the cognitive improvements are compatible with their account, or the beliefs produced by those improvements lack warrant. This paper presents two objections to this proper functionalist defense in un- designed cognitive improvement cases. First, cognitive malfunctions can produce warranted beliefs despite the luckiness involved in the information source forming process. Second, when adopting an evolutionary understanding of proper function, a lucky cognitive improvement can be possibly selected to become a proper function in later generations, thus should be counted as knowledge.

Nguyen's Echo Chamber and Why the Escape Plan Can be Less "Epistemic" than We Expect

Qiantong Wu (National University of Singapore)
吴倩彤（新加坡国立大学）

Abstract: In this paper, I am going to analyze the concept of the echo chamber and the escape plan in Nguyen＇s paper (2020)1. I will first introduce the concept of the echo chamber. Then, I will analyze the escape plan suggested by Nguyen and argue that, instead of a pure epistemic escape, the escape is mostly motivated by social needs, and it succeeds with the help of social pressure. To support my argument, I will adopt a model which demonstrates how an idealized epistemic community under the influence of mistrust may fail to avoid the polarization of opinions. Comparing the model with echo chambers in a real-life situation, I will conclude that a successful escape from the echo chamber through mere epistemic strength is more difficult than we expect.

Why We Should Spread Rumors

Enyuan Kang (East China Normal University)
康恩源（华东师范大学）

Abstract: In this article, I will argue that spreading rumors is justified. The reasons are as follows: First, rumors are a kind of testimony. In terms of their ability to provide knowledge, although certain features that distinguish rumors from general testimony make them sometimes less reliable, but in most cases, they are no less reliable than most other forms of testimony. Second, the unreliability of rumors in some cases can be compensated by some consequences of rumor-spreading. Spreading rumors can have good consequences. The good consequence are that, epistemologically, the spreading of rumors allows us to obtain more evidence in the future to test the truth of the rumor. To support the first reason, we need to compare the similarities and differences between rumors and testimony in general; To support the second reason, we need to analyze what epistemologically good consequences there are for spreading rumors. The first section will take on the first task, and the second section will take on the second.

The Metasemantic Foundations for Global Conceptual Engineering

整体概念工程的元语义基础
Lei Wang (Fudan University)
王磊（复旦大学）

Abstract: Conceptual engineering as a philosophical method has recently become a relatively popular meta-philosophical research subject. Its underlying assumption is that the concepts we actually use are not necessarily ideal and that improving them is an important desideratum of philosophy. The most radical version of this subject is "global conceptual engineering." It considers all concepts to be defective in some way and in need of improvement. Such a point of view faces two serious challenges: the lack of feasibility of revising all concepts and possible inconsistencies within the theory itself. This paper is committed to providing a metasemantic foundation for global conceptual engineering by exploring the nature of concepts. I argue that only conceptual role semantics can satisfy the criteria for a good metasemantic theory. And, if conceptual role semantics is accepted as the foundation of conceptual engineering, we can not only defend the feasibility of "global conceptual engineering" but dispel the risk of inconsistency in "global conceptual engineering."

摘要：“概念工程”作为一种哲学方法，最近成为了较为热门的元哲学研究对象。其基本假设是：我们实际使用的概念不一定是理想的，而对这些概念进行改进是哲学的一项重要工作。“整体概念工程”是该论题的一个激进版本。它认为所有的概念都或多或少存在问题，并需要改进。该观点面临严峻的挑战，包括修改所有概念的可行性，以及理论本身可能的不一致。本文旨在通过提供元语义理论上的基础为其辩护。我试图表明，只有概念角色语义学能够满足恰当的元语义理论的要求。而基于概念角色语义学，我们不仅可以捍卫“整体概念工程”的可行性，还能避免“整体概念工程”不一致的风险。

关键词：整体概念工程；元语义学；信息语义学；概念角色语义学

The Definition of Videogames: Normative Amelioration?

Kai Wang (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
王开（上海交通大学）

Abstract: The concept of the videogame is usually defined in a descriptive way including essential and anti-essential approaches. In this paper, we originally propose a normative approach to define the videogame according to conceptual engineering. We try discussing what the concept should be rather than its sufficient and necessary conditions. We hold the concept of the videogame should be ameliorated in this way because it can deal with some social issues especially social prejudice to the videogame group. Our conclusion is that the videogame should be defined as multi-function and value neutral.

Keywords: videogames; definitions; concept engineering; normative; social prejudice

Defending Strong Truth Pluralism

Zhiyuan Zhang (The Chinese University of HongKong, Shenzhen)
张致远（香港中文大学，深圳）

Abstract: Truth Pluralism is the view that there are multiple ways for propositions to be true. The strong version of it says that all true propositions only have domain-specific truth properties. In this paper, I defend strong pluralism by solving three seemingly formidable problems for it. First, I help strong pluralists solve the generalization problem by exploiting the equivalence schema (ES) advocated by minimalists. I argue that although the truth predicate in universal generalizations has reducible semantic content(s), it does not ascribe any truth property to propositions involved in the generalizations but merely occurs as the consequence of applications of (ES). I then apply this minimalist solution to the problem of mixed inferences and the problem of mixed compounds. It turns out that strong pluralism can overcome all these three problems once it concedes that mixed compounds are not apt for any substantive truth property. After replying to several possible objections, I finally conclude that as far as these mixing problems go, strong pluralism is in fact viable.

Keywords: Truth Pluralism; Strong Pluralism; Equivalence Schema; Minimalism

Regulative Norms and Localism: Revisit the Skeptical Challenge of Logical Normativity

Shaowen Ji (Sun Yat-sen University)
纪少文（中山大学）

Abstract: Harman (1986) famously challenges logical normativity, i.e., logic cannot play the normative role for reasoning. The prevailing response is to construct some bridge principles between the rules of logic and the rules of reasoning. In contrast, I argue that we can refute the challenge without constructing bridge principles, by defending the view that the main way in which logical norms function is as regulative norms rather than constitutive norms. Regulative norms show how to perform well rather than just how to perform. I argue that (i) modus ponens (MP) still operates as a constitutive norm of any reasoning, and (ii) only partial logical norms are reasoning norms, call it localism, which means that while there is a gap between reasoning and logic, it doesn＇t mean logic can＇t play the normative role in reasoning.

Keywords: logical normativity; norm; modus ponens; localism

Is Common Knowledge a Necessary Condition for Social Coordination? – An Investigation on the Paradox of Coordinated Attack Based on the Margin for Error Principle

公共知识是社会协同的必要条件吗？——基于误差余地原则对协同攻击悖论的考察

Yiheng Wang (Xiamen University)

王译恒（厦门大学）

Abstract：The infinite conjunction like "all subjects know a proposition, and all subjects know that all subjects know..." is called common knowledge. The paradox of coordinated attack has traditionally been used to demonstrate that common knowledge is a necessary condition for social coordination. Lederman points out that there are two implicit background assumptions in the paradox of coordinated attack: the assumption of common rationality and the assumption of common transparency, and tries to solve the paradox by negating the latter. The practice of denying the assumption of common rationality is misplaced. Based on the margin for error principle of knowledge, the paradox should be solved by negating the assumption of common transparency. Although common knowledge is not a necessary condition for social coordination, it is an idealized but beneficial assumption.

Key Words ： Common knowledge; Margin for error principle; Social coordination; Assumption of common transparency; Assumption of common rationality.

摘要：形如"所有主体都知道某命题，并且所有主体都知道所有主体都知道……"的无穷合取式被称为公共知识。协同攻击悖论在传统上常被用来论证公共知识是社会协同的必要条件。莱德曼指出协同攻击悖论中存在两个隐含的背景假设：公共理性假设和公共透明性假设，并试图通过否定前者来解决悖论。否定公共理性假设的做法是错位的。基于知识的误差余地原则，应该通过否定公共透明性假设来解决悖论。虽然公共知识不是社会协同的必要条件，但却是一种理想化的有益假设。

关键词: 公共知识；误差余地原则；社会协同；公共透明性；公共理性

Certainty: An Ignored Epistemic Notion

确定性：一种被忽视的认识概念

Luqi Tang (Zhejiang University)
唐璐琪（浙江大学）

Abstract: The certainty has been largely dismissed as an unattainable ideal in contemporary epistemology. However, it is quite normal to attribute the certain status to subject in everyday life. It seems to indicate that there is a gap between epistemology debate and everyday use of the concept of certainty. Few epistemologists currently contend that the certainty state is achievable in daily life. Based on this, this paper Based on this, this paper applies the semantics research approach to clarify the epistemic notion of certainty. This paper agrees that certainty, like knowledge, is a high but attainable epistemic status. This paper differs from earlier views in terms of gradability and factivity and argues that there is a distinction between knowledge and certainty. Certainty is gradable and non-factive. The paper will address the gap in the current certainty study in epistemology. If certainty is a non-factive epistemic state, it will also challenge the epistemic certainty norm of action based on Beddor's recent epistemic certainty account.

摘要：长久以来，当代知识论学界认为确定性是一种难以达及的认识状态，从而忽视对其的研究。然而，在现实生活中，人们对某一命题进行确定性归赋却是十分常见的。这似乎表明，确定性这一概念在哲学讨论和日常使用中存在着差异。当前，仅有少数几位知识论学者对确定性展开研究，主张确定性也是一种日常生活中可以达到的认识状态。本文将在此基础上，运用语义学的研究方法，对日常确定性这一认识概念进行厘清。本文主张确定性与知识一样是一种日常生活中可以达到的、较高的认识状态。但是在可分级性和事实性上，本文与前人的观点存在差异。本文认为，知识与确定性两种认识状态之间存在差异，确定性是可分级的和非事实性的。本文的研究将弥补当前知识论对确定性的概念研究的空白，并且如果确定性是一种非事实性的认识状态的话，这还将对贝多近期所提出的基于认识确定性概念之上的行动的认识确定性规范提出挑战。

关键词：确定性 知识 可分级性 非事实性

Is Wittgenstein a Foundationalist of Knowledge? A View on the Relations between Certainty and the Language Games

维特根斯坦是一个知识的基础主义者吗？——从确定性与语言游戏的关系看

Shengnan Zhao (Lanzhou University)
赵胜男（兰州大学）

Abstract：Wittgenstein exhibits the foundationalism character of knowledge in several places in On Certainty, which has led some scholars, such as Avrum Stroll, to characterize him as a foundationalist of knowledge. This paper argues, through a careful reading of the relevant remarks in On Certainty, that this is a misunderstanding based on a misreading of the text. Wittgenstein's certainty and language games have both divergent and interactive aspects. The former refers to the heterogeneity of certainty. There is heterogeneity between certainty and the language games and knowledge it supports, and there is also a high degree of heterogeneity within certainty. The latter refers to the fluidity of certainty, in which certainty and general empirical propositions may be transformed into each other. And refers to the reverse dependence, in which certainty depends on knowledge, and knowledge can anchor our certainty. These make it unjust to label Wittgenstein as a fundamentalist of knowledge.

Keywords：On Certainty, foundationalism, heterogeneity, fluidity, reverse dependence

摘要：维特根斯坦在《论确定性》中多处表现出知识的基础主义特征，这使得一些学者如斯特洛尔将其定性为一个知识的基础主义者。本文通过细致阅读《论确定性》的相关言论来论证，这是一种基于文本误读的误解。维特根斯坦的确定性和语言游戏既有分野的一面，又有互动的另一面，前者是指确定性的异质性，确定性与其支撑的语言游戏、知识之间是异质的，且确定性内部也高度异质；后者一是指确定性的流动性，确定性与一般经验命题可能发生相互转化，二是指反向依赖性，确定性需要依赖于知识，由知识才能锚定出我们的确定性。这使得将之标签化为知识的基础主义者是不公正的。

关键词：《论确定性》，基础主义，异质性，流动性，反向依赖性

Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth with the State of Affairs

基于事态的符合论辩护

Rong Zhu (Jiangsu Normal University)
竺蓉（江苏师范大学）

Abstract: The traditional correspondence theory of truth holds that truth is the correspondence of a proposition to a fact. However, correspondence theory does not provide a clear enough explanation of the correspondence relation. Reflecting on this, Armstrong and others attempted to base the correspondence relation on 'the truth-making relation' based on states of affairs, and 'the truth-maker theory' insisted that propositions have their substantive basis, but encountered problems in explaining factual entities. However, it encountered problems such as 'infinite regress' and 'irrelevant truth-makers'. Armstrong and others proposed the concepts of 'totality states of affairs' and 'minimal truth-maker' in this regard. It maintains the tradition of 'truth depends on the entities' in the theory of correspondence, and focuses on the ontological basis of 'what is true about a proposition', which enriches and expands the traditional theory of correspondence.

Key words: truth-maker; the correspondence theory; states of affairs; entities; infinite regress

摘要：按照传统的真理符合论，真理就是命题与事实的符合。然而，传统符合论预设"符合关系"是一个得到清晰解释的概念，没有对之作出较为彻底的阐释。对此的反思，促使阿姆斯特朗等人尝试将符合关系建基于事态的"使真关系"之上，随之产生的"使真者理论"坚持命题凭借其实体基础为真。针对解释事实实体的"无穷倒退"、"不相关使真者"等问题，阿姆斯特朗等人就此提出"整体主义"、"最小使真者"等概念。使真者理论是分析形而上学回应真理问题的创见，它保有符合论"真理依赖于实在"的传统，着力于解释"命题以何为真"的本体论基础，对传统符合论做出了丰富和拓展。

关键词：使真者理论；符合论；事态；实体；无穷倒退

Autonomy and the Reasons for Action

自主与行动理由

Feng Deng (China University of Political Science and Law)
邓峰（中国政法大学）

摘要：关于何种事实提供行动理由，客观理由论会认为，只有客观事实才能为行动者提供理由，而没有主观事实（例如个人意愿和态度）介入的空间。然而，客观理由论下的理由观念，无法独自完成实践推理，甚至可能提供"赘余"的理由，因此是失败的。而自主在实践推理中扮演重要的角色，通过创造行动者相关的属性的方式，为行动者提供行动理由。

The Self-Basis of Rawls' First Principle of Justice

论罗尔斯正义第一原则的"自我"根源

Yupeng Wang (Nanjing Normal University)
汪禹澎（南京师范大学）

Abstract: Among Rawls' two principles of justice, the first principle is called the "principle of equal liberty". The establishment of this principle is to ensure that in a society effectively regulated by the public conception of justice, each citizen exists as a free and equal individual "self" that can form, modify and develop their own conception of good. However, the possibility of this idea of "self" is questioned by contemporary utilitarians who believe that such a diachronic concept of "self" does not exist theoretically, then the "principle of equal liberty" has lost its necessity to exsit, and the principle of distributive justice must adopt the form of utilitarianism which is impersonal. Rawlsians try to take a Kantian perspective of practical reason to refute the Humean view taken by utilitarians. However, such refutation by resorting to the ability of human practical reason is more like avoiding the problem than solving them.

[Key words] personal identity; distributive justice; Rawls; Parfit; theoretical and practical reason

摘要：在罗尔斯的正义两原则中，第一原则被称为"平等的自由原则"。这一原则的设立是为了保障在一个被公共的正义观念有效调节的社会里，每个公民作为能够形成、修改和发展自身善观念的自由平等的个体"自我"而存在。然而，这一"自我"概念的可能性遭到了当代功利主义者的质疑，他们认为这样一种历时性的"自我"概念在理论上是不存在的，因此"平等的自由原则"也丧失了其必要性，分配正义应当采取一种非人称化的功利主义模式。罗尔斯主义者们试图采取一种康德式的实践理性视角来反驳功利主义者们采取的休谟主义式观点，然而，这种诉诸"自我"实践理性的反驳更像是对问题的回避而非解决。

A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions

Jakob Roloff (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen)
Jakob Roloff（吉森大学）

Abstract: Donald Davidson's causal theory of actions states that actions must be rationalized and caused by a belief-desire-pair. One problem of such a causal theory are cases of deviant causal chains. In these cases, the rationalized action is not caused in the right way but via a deviant causal chain. It therefore intuitively seems to be no action while all conditions of the causal theory are met. I argue that the problem of deviant causal chains can be solved by adding a teleofunctionalist condition. This condition requires that the belief-desire pair that rationalizes an action must cause that action in a selection-historically normal way. I try to show that this additional condition drops counterintuitive cases of deviant causal chains out of the class of actions while being flexible enough to classify such cases as actions in which causal detours are intuitively permissible.

How to Stop Worry about Swampman in Teleosemantics: A New Response to the Swampman Argument

Yihui Cheng (Peking University)
Yihui Cheng（北京大学）

Abstract: Teleosemantics is a theory of representational contents in terms of biological functions. A well-known objection to teleosemantics is the Swampman thought experiment (Davidson 1987), which has generated much discussion but no consensus. In this paper, I firstly introduce the theory of teleosemantics. There are two ways of attributing functionality to mechanisms in the theory, that is, evolutionary history and learning process, which make teleosemantics difficult to the Swampman argument. I further argue that existing responses from teleosemantics fail to deal with the problem about Swampman by a counterexample, namely, the Lucy case. The Lucy case has the same structure as the Swampman story except that Lucy is a real creature without the requisite type of history. However, none of existing responses in teleosemantics offer help in Lucy case. Then I go on a response for teleosemantics to Swampman by means of proposing a new way of attributing functionality. This supplementary way on the ground of currently human knowledge of physical mechanisms is commonly used on natural sciences and prevents teleosemantics from criticisms of Swamp-like creatures.

Key Words: teleosemantics, Swampman, history, function, mental content

Why the Interventionist should still Worry about the Exclusion Argument

Tong Pan (The University of Manchester)
潘童（曼彻斯特大学）

Abstract: The debate between reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism is central to philosophy of mind. Kim (1993; 1998; 2005) famously argues that mental properties' possessing causal powers supports the reductive thesis that the mental are identical to the physical. This is the so-called exclusion argument. Zhong (2014) claims that interventionism, as an independently plausible account of causation, shows that one of the premises of the exclusion argument, the principle of causal realization, is false. The aim of this essay is to defend the exclusion argument in the face of Zhong's attack. I argue that the interventionist objection is unconvincing because to falsify the principle of causal realization requires metaphysically impossible interventions, which are unacceptable to the interventionist. The interventionist non-reductive physicalist should still worry about the exclusion argument.

The Epistemic Status of Observation for Dismissivism

He Yuan (Wuhan University)
袁和（武汉大学）

Abstract: Epistemic Dismissivism on metaontology says that ontological disputes can be dismissed on epistemic grounds. Following Bradley's (2018) approach, I will use Bayesian confirmation theory to give a new epistemic mechanics implying that no conceivable observations can confirm one ontological theory (such as universal theory) over another (such as nominal theory). Then I will show that the theory-laden phenomena are a potential underminer for it. I will argue that the equal degree of confirmation by observations can explain the normative reason of the apparent impression that metaphysicians rather than scientists assign low energy on further observations to solve disputes. I will also argue that the plausibility of Epistemic Dismissivism depends on whether non-observational criterions are appropriate for evaluating competing ontological theories.

Keywords: Metaontology Dismissivism Observation

Creationism and Fictionalism about Fictional Characters: Analyzing Metafictional and Metaleptic Discourse

Kam-Ho Chan (Hong Kong Baptist University)
Kam-Ho Chan（香港浸会大学）

Abstract: This paper contrasts and compares Amie Thomasson's abstract creationism and Stuart Brock's fictionalism about fictional characters. This comparison shows that both theories rely on an internal/external distinction between fictional sentences, i.e., fictional context and real context. The paper introduces Jérôme Pelletier criticism of the internal/external distinction based on metafictional and metaleptic sentences. Metafictional sentences have terms that refer to real individuals in a fictional context. Metaleptic sentences show an apparent superimposition of fictional and real contexts. The paper argues that both theories are capable of providing a suitable analysis of metafictional sentences but a refined argument from metapleptic sentences has shown to be effective. The paper then suggests a way to analyze metafictional and metapleptic sentences as complex sentences. Finally, the paper concluded that fictionalism has a better chance to succeed due to its flexibility in adopting different analyses, for example the one suggested here.

Pure Universals: Total and Partial

Youssef Aguisoul (University of Lisbon)
Youssef Aguisoul（里斯本大学）

Abstract: In a realist constituent ontology, where material things are constituted by spatiotemporal universals, the attempts of resolving the ontological problem of individuation, the problem of individuating two undistinguishable things, are conditioned by the regulation that the attempter should only invoke pure or non- relational universals (e.g., being red). To solve the problem via impure or relational universals (e.g., being Aristotle) is therefore a transgression. I grant this. I will however demonstrate that the so-called Leibnizian essences (e.g., being Aristotle), which are repeatedly considered impure, are in fact pure as any other pure universal. Then I propose that these Leibnizian essences, which I describe total pure universals, as opposed to partial pure universals (e.g., being red), are plausible individuators.